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Evolutionary game theory has been widely used to study the evolution of cooperation in social
dilemmas where imitation-led strategy updates are typically assumed. However, results of recent
behavioral experiments are not compatible with the predictions based on the imitation dynamics,
casting doubts on the assumption of the imitation-led updates and calling for alternative mechanisms
of strategy updates. An aspiration-led update is often considered as an alternative to the imitation-
led one. While details of update rules can have significant impacts on the evolutionary outcomes and
many variations in imitation-led updates are thus studied, however, few variations exist in aspiration-
led updates. We introduce an aspiration-led update mechanism (“Satisfied-Defect, Unsatisfied-
Cooperate”) that is psychologically intuitive and can yield a behavior richer than the conventional
aspiration-led update does in Prisoner’s Dilemma games. Using analytical and numerical methods,
we study and link the stochastic dynamics of it in well-mixed finite populations and the deterministic
dynamics of infinite populations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Explaining cooperation among selfish individuals in so-
cial dilemmas is an important problem and has attracted
much interest across disciplines including physics [1–4].
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) captures the problem of
cooperation in the simplest and most challenging form
[5]. Two individuals can choose between cooperation and
defection. If one defects and the other cooperates, the
defector gets a higher payoff than the cooperator does.
They get a higher payoff if both cooperate than they do if
both defect. Even though they would be better off if both
cooperate, individual (rational) reasoning leads to defec-
tion in (one-shot) PD games. This illustrates a social
dilemma due to the tension between the social optimum
and individual interests. In an evolutionary setting, the
higher mean payoff of defectors implies more reproduc-
tive success (in genetic evolution) and more imitation (in
cultural evolution). Cooperation is thus expected to per-
ish. However, cooperation is often observed in real-world
social dilemmas.
Various mechanisms in the framework of the evolution-
ary game theory have been proposed to explain this ap-
parent paradox. For the nongenetic evolution of coopera-
tion, it is typically assumed that successful strategies are
spread by payoff-dependent imitation or social-learning
[1–4]. Payoff-dependent imitation means that an indi-
vidual first compares its payoff and that of another indi-
vidual, and then copies the strategy of the other if the
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payoff of the latter is higher. One of the main motiva-
tions behind the imitation-based strategy update is that
evolutionary game dynamics of the nongenetic evolution
becomes formally equivalent to that of the genetic one
[6]; similar mathematical models can describe both ge-
netic and nongenetic evolution of cooperation. Although
it is less applicable to lower animals that lack cogni-
tion capabilities required for social learning, the payoff-
dependent imitation is considered adequate for humans
and much theoretical work has been developed under this
assumption [1–4]. However, doubts have been cast on
the imitation-based update and alternatives to it have
been called for [7–9]. These are partly due to the re-
cent behavioral experiments on PD games, which showed
that humans do not compare payoffs when updating their
strategies [8, 10, 11]. Indeed, it is often the case that indi-
viduals cannot even perceive the payoff of others in many
real-world settings [9].
An alternative to imitation-based social learning would
be self-learning. For instance, the aspiration-based mech-
anism of strategy updates has been extensively investi-
gated [12–21]. According to the aspiration-based update,
individuals switch their strategy if the payoffs that they
aspire are not met. Unlike the imitation-based update,
it does not require any knowledge about the payoffs or
strategies of others. Hence, it can be also applicable to
the nongenetic evolution of cooperation in lower animals
lacking cognitive capacities required for payoff-based imi-
tation. Indeed, aspiration-based strategy updates are of-
ten observed in studies of both animal and human behav-
ioral ecology [22–28]. While imitation-based evolution-
ary dynamics yields cooperation to diminish, aspiration-
based dynamics yields the emergence and sustainability
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2of cooperation even in well-mixed infinite populations.
Since the details of the update rules can have signifi-
cant influences on the emergence and stabilization of co-
operation [29], it is well worth seeking alternative update
rules led by aspiration. To our knowledge, however, few
alternatives exist in aspiration dynamics. We consider
the whole space of aspiration-based update rules, which
includes the conventional aspiration-based update. We
formulate two psychologically intuitive properties that
the desirable update rules should obey. Among all the
rules, only one satisfies both properties. We analytically
and numerically study the deterministic evolutionary dy-
namics and the stochastic dynamics of the update rule
as well as link them.
II. MODEL DEFINITION
We consider the donation game version of PD games
with two (pure) strategies of cooperation (C) and defec-
tion (D) in well-mixed populations. A payoff matrix of
the game is given by
( C D
C 1− ρ −ρ
D 1 0
)
(1)
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the cost of cooperation. In a
well-mixed population, any pair of individuals play the
game with the same probability. In an infinite popula-
tion, thus, the mean payoffs of types C and D are
piC(x) = x− ρ, (2)
piD(x) = x (3)
where x ∈ [0, 1] denotes the (relative) abundance or fre-
quency of cooperators in the population. In a finite pop-
ulation, the mean payoffs are given by
piC(i) =
i− 1
N − 1 − ρ, (4)
piD(i) =
i
N − 1 (5)
where N denotes the population size and i the number
of cooperators.
III. ASPIRATION-BASED STRATEGY UPDATE
We consider the aspiration-based strategy updates
where the aspiration level is the same for all individuals
of a population. The conventional aspiration-led update
can be stated as follows; if one’s payoff is higher than
(or equal to) the aspiration level (i.e.pi ≥ A), then keep
the current strategy and otherwise (pi < A), switch it
to the other strategy [12, 16–21]. We term this update
rule ‘Satisfied-Stay, Unsatisfied-Shift’ (SSUS), which is a
special case of the reinforcement learning [30]. This de-
terministic rule is often relaxed to be stochastic, which re-
flects perception errors as well as other uncertainties and
drives the probabilistic change of the population compo-
sition. To model the stochastic switching of the strategy,
the following probability functions based on Fermi func-
tions are often used
qD→C(piD, A) =
1
1 + exp[−β(A− piD)] , (6)
qC→D(piC , A) =
1
1 + exp[−β(A− piC)] (7)
where qD→C denotes the probability for switching defec-
tion to cooperation, qC→D the probability for cooperation
to defection, β the selection intensity, and A the aspira-
tion level [31]. The lower payoff pi than aspiration A, the
more likely to switch the strategy; the higher payoff pi
than aspiration A, the less likely to switch the strategy.
As β →∞, the deterministic update rule is recovered.
IV. SATISFIED-DEFECT,
UNSATISFIED-COOPERATE
A. Space of strategy update rules
In order to derive an update rule, we explore the
whole space of (deterministic) update rules led by as-
piration with two strategies C and D. We can encode an
aspiration-based update rule as a finite state automaton
that has two states of C and D with transitions between
them being conditioned on whether pi ≥ A or not. The
encoding (SC+,SC−,SD+,SD−) specifies the strategy to
be taken SC+ and SD+ given pi ≥ A and the current
strategy of C and D, respectively. It also specifies the
strategy to be taken SC− and SD− given pi < A and the
current strategy of C and D, respectively. For instance,
SSUS is encoded as (C,D,D,C) (Table I). In total, there
are 24 finite state automata of this form. We present two
properties that a desirable update rule should obey, each
of which is psychologically intuitive.
The first property is conditional switching. The strat-
egy to be taken when ‘satisfied’ (i.e.pi ≥ A) should differ
from the one when ‘unsatisfied’ (i.e.pi < A). This prop-
erty excludes those rules which yield the same strategy
regardless of ‘satisfied’ or not; e.g. the rule of cooperate-
no-matter (C,C,C,C). Among the 16 update rules, four
rules satisfy the property of the conditional switching,
including SSUS (Table II).
The second property is the selfishness or cost mini-
mization while in satisfaction. For the same outcome of
‘satisfied’ (i.e.pi ≥ A), we assume that individuals prefer
defection to cooperation since the latter incurs a cost.
For a satisfied cooperator (piC ≥ A), switching to defec-
tion makes sense in that the aspiration is still expected
to be met after the switching, but without the cost of co-
operation since piD > piC ≥ A. That is to say, one defects
when the aspiration is met. There are four update rules
which satisfy the cost-minimization property (Table III).
Among the 16 finite state automaton, there is only
one rule that meets both of the properties, which is
3TABLE I. An encoding scheme of an aspiration-based update rule as a finite state automaton that describes transitions between
two states of C and D, conditioned on pi ≥ A or not. SSUS is encoded as (C,D,D,C).
pi ≥ A pi < A
C SC+ SC−
D SD+ SD−
⇐⇒ (SC+,SC−,SD+,SD−),
pi ≥ A pi < A
C C D
D D C
⇐⇒ (C,D,D,C)
TABLE II. Four update rules that satisfy the conditional
switching property.
(C,D,C,D), (C,D,D,C), (D,C,C,D), (D,C,D,C)
TABLE III. Four update rules that satisfy the cost-
minimization property.
(D,C,D,D), (D,D,D,C), (D,D,D,D), (D,C,D,C).
(D,C,D,C). We name the (D,C,D,C) rule ‘Satisfied-
Defect, Unsatisfied-Cooperate’ (SDUC). The SDUC rule
specifies defection to be taken when the aspiration is met
(pi ≥ A) and cooperation to be taken when the aspiration
is not met (pi < A). The switching probabilities of SDUC
are given by
qD→C(piD, A) =
1
1 + exp[−β(A− piD)] , (8)
qC→D(piC , A) =
1
1 + exp[−β(piC −A)] . (9)
Note that it only differs in qC→D, compared to those of
SSUS [Eqs. (6) and (7)]. In the next sections, we analyze
the evolutionary dynamics of SDUC in infinite and finite
populations as well as compare them with those of SSUS.
V. INFINITE POPULATIONS
For a well-mixed infinite population, the mean-field
equation of deterministic evolutionary dynamics is given
by
dx
dt
= (1− x)qD→C − xqC→D (10)
where the first term on the right-hand side captures the
inflow of individuals switching to cooperation, and the
second one, the outflow of those switching from coopera-
tion to defection. At dx/dt = 0, we have an equilibrium
frequency x∗ of cooperators, which satisfies
x∗ =
qD→C
qD→C + qC→D
. (11)
Under weak selection 0 < β  1, we can approximate
the equilibrium by
x∗ ≈ qD→C
qD→C + qC→D
∣∣∣∣
β=0
+
∂
∂β
(
qD→C
qD→C + qC→D
) ∣∣∣∣
β=0
β.
(12)
Prior to SDUC, we start with the analysis of SSUS. Al-
though there already exists an analysis of SSUS in an
infinite population, it is limited only to the determinis-
tic update, corresponding to the strong selection β →∞
[21]. Our analytical study is based on a stochastic update
or weak selection and we numerically study the strong se-
lection cases as well.
A. x∗ of SSUS
Under the SSUS rule, at equilibrium, we get
x∗ =
1 + exp[−β(A− piC)]
2 + exp[−β(A− piC)] + exp[−β(A− piD)] . (13)
Under weak selection β  1, we get
x∗ ≈ 1
2
+
1
8
β(piC − piD), (14)
which yields
x∗ ≈ 1
2
− 1
8
βρ (15)
which is subject to the constraint 0 ≤ x∗ ≤ 1. The
aspiration level A has no impact on x∗ that decreases
with β and ρ. The condition for cooperation to be more
abundant than defection x∗ > 1/2 is
ρ < 0. (16)
However, the condition cannot be met since 0 < ρ < 1
for PD games. Thus, cooperation cannot be more abun-
dant than defection under SSUS. Only x∗ < 1/2 holds.
Although our analytical derivation of x∗ < 1/2 is based
on the assumption of weak selection β  1, it also holds
well for strong selection β  1 (Fig. 1). However, the
analytical approximation of x∗ [Eq. (15)] works well for
weak selection β, but not so for strong selection.
B. x∗ of SDUC
Under the SDUC rule, at equilibrium, we have
x∗ =
1 + exp[−β(piC −A)]
2 + exp[−β(piC −A)] + exp[−β(A− piD)] . (17)
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FIG. 1. The equilibrium x∗ of SSUS vs. aspiration level A, cost ρ, and selection strength β. The circles and triangles indicate
the equilibrium obtained by numerically solving Eq. (13). The solid lines indicates the analytical approximation of x∗ by
Eq. (15), which works well only for weak selection. The dashed line indicates x∗ = 1/2.
The weak selection approximation of x∗ is given by
x∗ ≈ 1
2
−
(
piC + piD − 2A
8
)
β, (18)
which yields
x∗ ≈ 2 + (A+ ρ/2)β
4 + β
. (19)
Note that the equilibrium frequency x∗ of SDUC
[Eq. (19)] behaves in manners qualitatively different from
that of SSUS [Eq. (15)]. First, x∗ increases with A un-
der SDUC, whereas it does not depend on A at all under
SSUS. Second, x∗ increases with ρ under SDUC, whereas
it decreases under SSUS. Third, as β increases, x∗ strictly
increases, decreases or is constant since ∂x∗/∂β =
4 [A− (1− ρ)/2] /(β + 4)2 under SDUC, whereas it only
decreases under SSUS. We get cooperation more abun-
dant x∗ > 1/2 if the following condition is met
A >
1− ρ
2
, (20)
which is feasible. In other words, cooperation can be
more abundant than defection under SDUC. The higher
A or ρ, the easier for cooperation to be more abundant.
Although we have x∗ < 1 for any finite β because of the
nonzero switching probabilities qD→C > 0 and qC→D >
0 [Eq. (8) and 9], an almost full cooperation x∗ ≈ 1 is
feasible if both of the following conditions are met:
A >
2− ρ
2
, (21)
β ≥ 4
(ρ+ 2A− 2) , (22)
which are derived by setting the condition for x∗ ≥ 1
from Eq. (19). Although the conditions are derived under
weak selection, they work well even for strong selection
(Fig. 2). The higher A, ρ, or β, the easier the almost full
cooperation occurs. Note that the analytical approxima-
tion of x∗ [Eq. (19)] works well even for strong selection
β  1 under SDUC, unlike that of SUSS.
VI. FINITE POPULATIONS
The deterministic evolutionary dynamics led by aspi-
ration assumes an infinite population. For a finite pop-
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FIG. 2. The equilibrium frequency x∗ of SDUC vs. aspiration level A, cost ρ, and selection strength β. The circles and triangles
indicate the equilibrium obtained by numerically solving Eq. (17). The solid lines indicates the analytical approximation of
the equilibrium by x∗ ≈ [2 + (A+ ρ/2)β] / (4 + β) [Eq. (19)], which works well even for strong selection β  1. Where
x∗ ≈ [2 + (A+ ρ/2)β] / (4 + β) > 1, it just needs to be capped at x∗ = 1 since x∗ is subject to 0 ≤ x∗ ≤ 1.
ulation, we have stochastic evolutionary dynamics. We
present the stochastic dynamics of SDUC and compare
it with that of SSUS. The microprocess at the individual
level is modeled as follows: in each time step, an indi-
vidual is chosen at random, who obtains its payoff in the
donation game and switches its strategy with probability
qC→D or qD→C . For a finite population of size N , the state
of the population can be specified with the abundance or
number of cooperators i. The stochastic dynamics of the
finite system can be modeled as a Markov chain of a
one-dimensional birth-death process in discrete time. In
each time step, the number of cooperators i increases by
one with probability T+i (as a defector switches to be a
cooperator), decreases by one with probability T−i (as a
cooperator switches to be a defector), or does not change
with probability T 0i . Only these three events are possi-
ble in each time step, i.e., all other transitions have zero
probability. The transition probabilities of the Markov
chain are given by
T+i =
N − i
N
qD→C , (23)
T−i =
i
N
qC→D, (24)
T 0i = 1− T+i − T−i . (25)
Let (ψ0, . . . , ψj , . . . , ψN ) denote the stationary distri-
bution over the abundance or number of cooperators. In
general, the stationary distribution of a Markov chain can
be obtained as the eigenvector of the transition matrix
associated with the largest eigenvalue of 1. For an one-
dimensional birth-death process [32–34], the stationary
distribution is also given by
ψj =

1
1+
∑N
k=1 Π
k
i=1T
+
i−1/T
−
i
: j = 0
Πji=1T
+
i−1/T
−
i
1+
∑N
k=1 Π
k
i=1T
+
i−1/T
−
i
: j > 0.
(26)
Note that for j > 0, we have
ψj = ψ0Π
j
i=1T
+
i−1/T
−
i = ψj−1T
+
j−1/T
−
j (27)
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FIG. 3. Stationary distributions ψi under SDUC. A =
0.8, ρ = 0.1.
(Fig. 3). The mean abundance of cooperation is given by
〈X〉 =
N∑
j=0
j
N
ψj . (28)
Under weak selection 0 < β  1, the stationary distri-
bution ψj can be approximated (to the first order) by
ψj ≈ ψj
∣∣
β=0
+
∂ψj
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=0
β. (29)
A. 〈X〉 of SSUS
Under SSUS, a weak selection condition for coopera-
tion to be more abundant than defection 〈X〉 > 1/2 is
given by
1− ρ+ (−ρ) > 1 + 0, (30)
i.e., the sum of payoff entries for cooperation should be
larger than that for defection. For the derivation of
Eq. (30), see Ref. [20] where the condition for 〈X〉 > 1/2
was analytically derived, but not 〈X〉 itself. However, the
condition of Eq. (30) is equivalent to ρ < 0, that is the
same as that of infinite populations [Eq. (16)] and can-
not be met. Under SSUS, cooperation cannot be more
abundant than defection in finite populations nor infinite
populations.
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FIG. 4. Mean abundance 〈X〉 vs. aspiration level A. 〈X〉
is computed numerically. The horizontal (dotted) line corre-
sponds to 〈X〉 = 1/2 and the vertical line, A = (1 − ρ)/2 =
0.45 where ρ = 0.1. It clearly demonstrates the validity of
Eq. (34) as the condition for 〈X〉 > 1/2, which works well
even for strong selection β = 100.
B. 〈X〉 of SDUC
Under SDUC, the transition probabilities are given by
T+i =
N − i
N
1
1 + e−β[A−piD(i)]
, (31)
T−i =
i
N
1
1 + e−β[piC(i)−A]
. (32)
Under weak selection, we get an analytical approximation
of the mean abundance by
〈X〉 ≈ 1
2
+
1
8
(2A+ ρ− 1)β. (33)
For the derivation of Eq. (33), see Appendix A. The con-
dition for cooperation to be more abundant than defec-
tion 〈X〉 > 1/2 is then given by
A >
1− ρ
2
. (34)
Although the condition [Eq. (34)] is derived under weak
selection, it works well for strong selection (Fig. 4). Note
that the condition of finite populations [Eq. (34)] is the
same as that of infinite populations [Eq. (20)]. Under
SDUC, cooperation can be more abundant than defection
in both finite and infinite populations under the same
condition.
C. Correspondence between stochastic and
deterministic dynamics
For infinite populations, the abundance of cooperation
is captured by the equilibrium frequency x∗ that can be
analytically approximated and we straightforwardly de-
rive the condition for x∗ > 1/2 from it. For finite popu-
lations, the abundance of cooperation is captured by the
mean 〈X〉 of the stationary distribution. Although the
condition for 〈X〉 > 1/2 was analytically derived, 〈X〉 it-
self was not so in the previous work [19, 20]. The lack of
7an analytical representation of 〈X〉 limits further under-
standing of the aspiration dynamics of finite populations.
It also makes it difficult to link the stochastic dynamics
of a finite population and the deterministic dynamics of
an infinite population [19]. One could consider the lat-
ter as a limit case of the former as the population size
increases to infinity
In our work, we analytically approximate 〈X〉
[Eq. (33)], that not only yields the condition for 〈X〉 >
1/2 [Eq. (34)] in a straightforward manner, but also
provides further insights on the stochastic dynamics of
SDUC in finite populations. According to Eq. (33), for
instance, 〈X〉 ≈ 1/2 + (2A+ ρ− 1)β/8 increases with A
and ρ. According to Eq. (19), this is qualitatively simi-
lar to x∗ ≈ [4 + (2A+ ρ)β] / [2(4 + β)] in that the latter
also increases with A and ρ in infinite populations. How-
ever, the analytical approximations Eqs. (33) and (19) of
〈X〉 and x∗ do not match each other whereas numeri-
cally computed 〈X〉 and x∗ do so. One way to resolve
this incompatibility between the analytical approxima-
tions would be to linearize Eq. (19) in β by
x∗ ≈ 1
2
+
1
8
(2A+ ρ− 1)β. (35)
Then we get
〈X〉 ≈ x∗ ≈ 1
2
+
1
8
(2A+ ρ− 1)β (36)
and we analytically establish a quantitative correspon-
dence between the dynamics of finite and infinite pop-
ulations. However, the correspondence is achieved at a
cost of approximation accuracy of Eq. (36), which works
well only for weak selection (Fig. 5).
While keeping Eq. (19) that well approximates x∗ even
for strong selection (Fig. 2), we provide a better alter-
native in analytically establishing the quantitative cor-
respondence between the dynamics of finite and infinite
populations. Rather than the mean 〈X〉, we capture the
abundance of cooperation by the mode of the stationary
distribution, i.e., the number (of cooperators) that occurs
most frequently where the distribution peaks. Our ap-
proximation i∗ of the mode satisfies
T+i∗−1/T
−
i∗ = 1, (37)
which yields
i∗
N + 1
=
1 + e−β[piC(i
∗)−A]
2 + e−β[piC(i∗)−A] + e−β[A−piD(i∗−1)]
(38)
For the derivation of Eq. (37) and 38, see Appendix B.
Equation (38) is a finite analog of Eq. (17). Note that
i∗ is a real number approximation of the (integer) mode
bi∗c, the most frequent number of cooperators in a finite
population where bi∗c denotes the largest integer that is
less than or equal to i∗. In slight abuse of notation, we
will write i∗ in place of bi∗c. What we are interested in is
the (normalized) mode bi∗c/N that is well approximated
by i∗/N since i∗/N − bi∗c/N < 1/N is negligible for a
large N . From Eq. (38) under weak selection β  1, we
get
i∗
N + 1
≈ 1
2
− 1
8
[piC(i
∗) + piD(i∗ − 1)− 2A]β, (39)
which yields
i∗
N + 1
≈ N − 1
4(N − 1) + (N + 1)β
[
2 +
(
A+
ρ
2
+
1
N − 1
)
β
]
.
(40)
Note that Eqs. (39) and (40) are finite analogs of
Eqs. (18) and (19), respectively (Fig. 6). For a large pop-
ulation size N , Eq. (40) is simplified by
i∗
N
≈ 2 + (A+ ρ/2)β
4 + β
. (41)
From Eqs. (41) and (19), we have
i∗
N
≈ x∗ ≈ 2 + (A+ ρ/2)β
4 + β
. (42)
Using the analytical approximation of a high accuracy, we
are able to link the dynamics of finite populations to that
of infinite populations where the mode (of a stationary
distribution) of the stochastic dynamics corresponds to
the equilibrium frequency of the deterministic dynamics
(Fig. 7).
D. Analytical approximations of stationary
distributions
The mean and the mode would have a less predictive
meaning if the deviation of the stationary distribution
is relatively large [35]. To estimate the deviation, under
weak selection, we analytically approximate the station-
ary distribution by
ψi/ψ0 ∝ exp
[
− (i− µ)
2
2σ2
]
(43)
where
µ =
N(N − 1)
4(N − 1) +Nβ
(
2 +
[
A+
ρ
2
+
1
2(N − 1)
]
β
)
,
(44)
σ2 =
N(N − 1)
4(N − 1) +Nβ . (45)
For the derivation of Eq. (43), see Appendix C. The sta-
tionary distribution ψi is thus approximated by a normal
distribution Nµ,σ(i) of mean µ and standard deviation
σ. Note that the mean µ of the normal distribution well
approximates the mode i∗ of the stationary distribution
[Eq. (40)] (Fig. 8). For a large N , Eqs. (44) and (45) are
simplified by
µ
N
≈ 2 + (A+ ρ/2β
4 + β
, (46)
σ
N
≈ 1√
N (4 + β)
. (47)
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FIG. 5. Mean abundance 〈X〉 of SDUC vs. aspiration level A, cost ρ, and selection strength β. The population size is N = 100.
The circles and triangles indicate 〈X〉 numerically obtained. The dashed curves represents the equilibrium frequency x∗ in an
infinite population, which is obtained by numerically solving Eq. (17) as in Fig. 2. 〈X〉 and x∗ numerically well match each
other. The solid curves represent the analytical approximations by Eq. (36), which work well only for weak selection β.
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FIG. 6. Mode i∗/N of SDUC vs. aspiration level A. The
circles and triangles denote the mode numerically obtained
by locating the peak of the discrete distribution ψi. The solid
curves represent the analytical approximation of the mode by
Eq. (40). The analytical approximation well fits the ground
truth even for strong selection β = 100.
Eq. (46) of µ/N well matches Eq. (42) of i∗/N and x∗.
Because the standard deviation is relatively small for a
large N , the mean and the mode of the distribution have
a predictive meaning. As the population size N → ∞,
especially, the (normalized) standard deviation σ/N van-
ishes with 1/
√
N and the distribution thus converges to
a delta function that peaks at x∗ where stochastic fluc-
tuations are suppressed (Figs. 9 and 10). In contrast to
the previous work [19, 20], we analytically show the link
between the stochastic aspiration dynamics of a finite
population and the deterministic dynamics of an infinite
population, the latter of which is taken as a limit case of
the former as the population size increases to infinity.
VII. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Imitation-based strategy updates have been widely
used to study the evolution of cooperation in social dilem-
mas. However, the results of the recent behavioral exper-
iments question the applicability of the imitation dynam-
ics and it is thus well worth considering alternatives such
as aspiration dynamics. In PD games, conventional as-
piration dynamics yields the coexistence of cooperation
and defection at equilibrium in an infinite population and
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FIG. 7. Mode i∗/N of SDUC vs. aspiration level A, cost ρ and selection strength β. The population size is N = 100. The
circles and triangles indicate i∗/N numerically obtained. The dashed curves represent the equilibrium frequency x∗ in an
infinite population, which is obtained by numerically solving Eq. (17) as in Fig. 2. i∗/N and x∗ well matches each other. The
solid curves represent the analytical approximations by Eq. (42), which work well even for strong selection β.
a nontrivial stationary distribution in a finite population.
In contrast, imitation dynamics yields the extinction of
cooperation in a well-mixed infinite population and fixa-
tion in a finite population.
The details of the update rules can have significant im-
pacts on the evolutionary outcomes and numerous vari-
ations in imitation dynamics have been studied such as
birth-death, death-birth, Moran process, pairwise com-
parison, imitate-the-best, etc. To our knowledge, how-
ever, few variations exist in aspiration dynamics. There
are additional reasons to seek alternative mechanisms
of strategy updates in aspiration dynamics. Although
aspiration-led strategy updates are often observed in
studies of both animal and human behavioral ecology,
not all of them comply with the conventional aspiration-
led update by SSUS. Being conditioned on the current
strategy as well as the payoff-aspiration difference, SSUS
yields a different strategy depending on the current strat-
egy. When the aspiration level is met, for instance,
some individuals (continue to) cooperate while others de-
fect according to SSUS. In animal behavior, however, a
strategy update is often conditioned on only the payoff-
aspiration difference, but not the current strategy. In
the variance-sensitive foraging behavior of animals, for
example, whether animals choose a variance-averse strat-
egy or a variance-prone strategy is entirely conditioned
on whether an aspiration level is met or not, but not on
the current strategy [36, 37]. SSUS is a kind of reinforce-
ment learning that assumes humans to do less or abandon
the strategy diminishing in value and switch to the other
strategy potentially more rewarding. However, humans
sometimes show an opposing tendency, trying harder at
what they have been doing rather than less [38–40]. In
the context of aspiration-led strategy updates, this im-
plies that individuals do not necessarily switch the cur-
rent strategy even if the aspiration is not met, contrary
to SSUS.
With these motivations behind, we search the whole
space of strategy update rules led by aspiration to derive
a rule that meets the desirable properties. Previously, a
space of conditional cooperative strategies was searched
to derive desirable strategies in imitation dynamics [41].
Rather than a space of strategies in imitation dynam-
ics, we search a space of strategy update mechanisms in
aspiration dynamics and introduce SDUC as an alter-
native to SSUS. Depending on the payoff-aspiration dif-
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FIG. 8. The stationary distributions ψi are well approxi-
mated by the normal distributions Nµ,σ(i). The circles and
triangles indicate ψi that is numerically obtained. The solid
curves indicate the normal distributions Nµ,σ(i).
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FIG. 9. Normalized standard deviation σ/N vs. population
size N . The solid curves denote analytical approximation of
the deviation [Eq. (45)]. The circles and the triangles denote
the deviation numerically computed. The deviation decreases
as the population size increases.
ference, SDUC specifies which strategy to “take”, while
SSUS specifies whether to “switch” the current strategy.
SDUC seems psychologically intuitive in that individuals
opt for the costly pro-social action of cooperation only
when they are in need and opt against it otherwise.
For an infinite population, we get an analytical approx-
imation of the abundance of cooperation at equilibrium
for SSUS and SDUC, respectively. From the equilibrium
abundance, we can straightforwardly derive the condi-
tion that yields more abundant cooperation than defec-
tion. SDUC is simpler than SSUS in that the strategy
update of SDUC is conditioned on the payoff-aspiration
difference but not on the current strategy, whereas SSUS
is conditioned on both. However, SDUC yields more va-
riety in the evolutionary outcomes of PD games than
0
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T
+
(x
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T
−
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N = 103, T+(x) N = 103, T−(x) N = 103, ψ(x)
FIG. 10. The transition probabilities and the stationary
distribution over x = i/N where T+(x) = T+i , T
−(x) = T−i
and ψ(x) = ψi. The vertical line indicates the location of
the equilibrium x∗ of the deterministic dynamics, which well
matches the mode i∗/N of the stationary distributions as well
as x = x∗ such that T+(x∗) = T−(x∗). For visual clarity, the
graphs of distributions ψ(x) are scaled such that each of them
has the same height at the mode.
SSUC does, the latter of which only yields cooperation
to be less abundant. SDUC can yield cooperation more
abundant than defection and vice versa. SDUC can even
lead to almost full cooperation.
For a finite population, the previous works analytically
derived the condition for more abundant cooperation, but
not the abundance of cooperation itself [19, 20]. The lack
of the analytical representation of the abundance lim-
its further understanding of aspiration dynamics of finite
populations and causes difficulty in linking the dynam-
ics between finite and infinite populations. In our work,
we derive the analytical representations of the abundance
of cooperation as well as the stationary distributions in
finite populations for SDUS. From the analytical repre-
sentations, we straightforwardly derive the condition for
more abundant cooperation and link the stochastic dy-
namics of finite populations to the deterministic dynam-
ics of infinite populations, the latter of which is consid-
ered as a limit case of the former as the population size
increases to infinity.
SSUS and SDUC also yield differences in terms of
the relation between cooperation and cost. The abun-
dance of cooperation under SSUS decreases with the cost
of cooperation, which also corroborates the outcome of
imitation-led evolutionary dynamics [42, 43]. On the
other hand, the abundance of cooperation under SDUC
increases with the cost, which appears somewhat counter-
intuitive. When more realistic ecological factors are
taken into consideration, however, similar positive cor-
relations between cooperation and cost occur due to the
spatial self-organization in imitation-led eco-evolutionary
dynamics [44–46]. While the eco-evolutionary dynamics
requires additional complexities such as a structured pop-
ulation, a nonconstant population size and movements
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of individuals, SDUC yields the positive correlation in a
minimal model that assumes only a well-mixed popula-
tion of a constant size and does not require movements
of individuals.
We hope that the introduction of SDUC paves a way of
searching for further mechanisms of aspiration-led strat-
egy updates. For instance, the space of possible update
rules could be expanded by taking the cost of cooperation
into account in addition to the aspiration level.
Appendix A: Derivation of Eq. (33)
We seek the condition that yields cooperation to be
more abundant than defection 〈X〉 > 1/2 under weak
selection 0 < β  1. According to Eqs. (28) and (29),
the mean abundance 〈X〉 can be approximated by
〈X〉 =
N∑
j=0
j
N
ψj ≈
N∑
j=0
j
N
(
ψj
∣∣
β=0
+
∂ψj
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=0
β
)
.
(A1)
The stationary distribution ψj is given by Eq. (26):
ψj =

1
1+
∑N
k=1 Π
k
i=1T
+
i−1/T
−
i
: j = 0
Πji=1T
+
i−1/T
−
i
1+
∑N
k=1 Π
k
i=1T
+
i−1/T
−
i
: j > 0.
We consider only ψj for j > 0 since
j
Nψj for j = 0
has effectively no contribution to the mean abundance of
cooperation 〈X〉 = ∑Nj=0 jNψj = ∑Nj=1 jNψj .
Let us denote the distribution by ψj = ψN , j/ψD where
the nominator ψN , j and the denominator ψD are given
by
ψN , j = Π
j
i=1T
+
i−1/T
−
i , (A2)
ψD = 1 +
N∑
k=1
ψN , k. (A3)
To derive the condition for 〈X〉 > 1/2 under weak
selection, we need to compute
ψj |β=0 = ψN , j
ψD
∣∣∣
β=0
, (A4)
∂ψj
∂β
∣∣∣
β=0
=
ψ′N , jψD − ψN , jψ′D
(ψD)
2
∣∣∣∣∣
β=0
, (A5)
which are to be inserted into Eq. (A1).
From Eqs. (31) and (32),
T+i =
N − i
N
1
1 + e−β[A−piD(i)]
,
T−i =
i
N
1
1 + e−β[piC(i)−A]
.
We then have
T+i |β=0 =
N − i
2N
, (A6)
T−i |β=0 =
i
2N
, (A7)
(T+i )
′|β=0 = N − i
4N
[A− piD(i)], (A8)
(T−i )
′|β=0 = i
4N
[piC(i)−A], (A9)
where (T+i )
′ = ∂T+i
/
∂β and (T−i )
′ = ∂T−i
/
∂β . Insert-
ing Eqs. (A6) and (A7) into Eqs. (A2) and (A3), we get
ψN , j |β=0 = CjN , (A10)
ψD|β=0 = 2N , (A11)
where CjN = N !/ (j!(N − j)!) is a binomial coefficient.
We get
ψ′N , j
∣∣
β=0
=
j∑
i=1
[(
T+i−1
)′
T−i − T+i−1
(
T−i
)′(
T−i
)2 Πjk=1,k 6=iT+k−1T−k
] ∣∣∣∣∣
β=0
,
(A12)
ψ′D|β=0 =
N∑
j=1
ψ′N , j
∣∣
β=0
. (A13)
From Eq. (A6) to A9, we get(
T+i−1
)′
T−i − T+i−1
(
T−i
)′(
T−i
)2 ∣∣∣∣
β=0
=
N − (i− 1)
2i
[2A− piC(i)− piD(i− 1)], (A14)
Πjk=1,k 6=i
T+k−1
T−k
∣∣∣∣
β=0
=
i
N − (i− 1)C
j
N . (A15)
Inserting Eqs. (A14) and (A15) into Eq. (A12), we get
ψ′N , j
∣∣
β=0
=
CjN
2
j∑
i=1
[2A− piC(i)− piD(i− 1)] , (A16)
ψ′D|β=0 =
N∑
j=1
CjN
2
j∑
i=1
[2A− piC(i)− piD(i− 1)].
(A17)
Inserting Eqs. (A10), (A11), (A16), and (A17) into
Eqs. (A4) and (A5), we get
ψj
∣∣
β=0
=
CjN
2N
, (A18)
∂ψj
∂β
∣∣∣
β=0
=
CjN
22N+1
{
A2N+1j − 2N
j∑
i=1
[piC(i) + piD(i− 1)]
−AN2N +
N∑
k=1
CkN
k∑
i=1
[piC(i) + piD(i− 1)]
}
(A19)
12
where piC(i) +piD(i−1) = 2(i−1)/(N −1)−ρ according
to Eqs. (4) and (5).
Using
N∑
j=1
j3CjN = N
2(N + 3)2N−3, (A20)
N∑
j=1
j2CjN = N(N + 1)2
N−2, (A21)
N∑
j=1
jCjN = N2
N−1, (A22)
we get
N∑
j=1
j
N
ψj
∣∣
β=0
=
1
2
, (A23)
N∑
j=1
j
N
∂ψj
∂β
∣∣∣
β=0
=
1
8
(2A+ ρ− 1) . (A24)
Then we get
〈X〉 ≈
N∑
j=1
j
N
ψj
∣∣
β=0
+
N∑
j=1
j
N
∂ψj
∂β
∣∣∣
β=0
=
1
2
+
1
8
(2A+ ρ− 1)β. (33)
Appendix B: Derivation of Eqs. (37) and (38)
From Eqs. (31) and (32), we have
T+i−1/T
−
i =
N − i+ 1
i
1 + e−β[piC(i)−A]
1 + e−β[A−piD(i−1)]
. (B1)
Since T+0 /T
−
1 > 1, T
+
N−1/T
−
N < 1, and T
+
i∗−1/T
−
i∗
strictly decreases with real numbers i∗ ∈ (0, N) ⊂ R,
there is a single real number i∗ that satisfies
T+i∗−1/T
−
i∗ = 1, (37)
which yields
i∗
N + 1
=
1 + e−β[piC(i
∗)−A]
2 + e−β[piC(i∗)−A] + e−β[A−piD(i∗−1)]
. (38)
Note that i∗ is a real number approximation of the mode
that is an integer, the most frequent number of cooper-
ators. For integers i ∈ [0, N ] ⊂ Z, T+i−1/T−i strictly de-
creases with i. Then we have T+i−1/T
−
i > 1 for i < bi∗c,
T+i−1/T
−
i ≥ 1 for i = bi∗c and T+i−1/T−i < 1 for i > bi∗c
where bi∗c denotes the largest integer that is less than or
equal to i∗. Since ψi = ψi−1T+i−1/T
−
i , the discrete distri-
bution ψi picks at i = bi∗c that is the (integer) mode of
the distribution (Fig. 10).
Appendix C: Derivation of Eq. (43)
Under weak selection β  1, we have
T+j−1
T−j
≈ N − j + 1
j
(
1− ρβ
2
)
exp
[
−β
(
j − 1
N − 1 − ρ−A
)]
.
(C1)
Inserting Eq. (C1) into Eq. (27) as well as using(
1− ρ2β
)k ≈ e−k ρ2β and N !k!(N−k)!pk(1 − p)N−k ≈
1√
2piNp(1−p) exp
[
− (k−Np)22Np(1−p)
]
[47], we get
ψi/ψ0 ∝ exp
[
− (i− µ)
2
2σ2
]
(43)
where
µ =
N(N − 1)
4(N − 1) +Nβ
(
2 +
[
A+
ρ
2
+
1
2(N − 1)
]
β
)
,
(44)
σ2 =
N(N − 1)
4(N − 1) +Nβ . (45)
[1] F. C. Santos and J. M. Pacheco, Physical Review Letters
95, 098104 (2005).
[2] G. Szabo´, J. Vukov, and A. Szolnoki, Physical Review
E 72, 047107 (2005).
[3] H. S. Sugiarto, J. S. Lansing, N. N. Chung, C. H. Lai,
S. A. Cheong, and L. Y. Chew, Physical Review Letters
118, 208301 (2017).
[4] V. Stojkoski, Z. Utkovski, L. Basnarkov, and L. Kocarev,
Physical Review E 97, 052305 (2018).
[5] M. van Veelen, J. Garc´ıa, D. G. Rand, and M. A. Nowak,
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109,
9929 (2012).
[6] A. Traulsen, D. Semmann, R. D. Sommerfeld, H.-J.
Krambeck, and M. Milinski, Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 107, 2962 (2010).
[7] D. Vilone, J. J. Ramasco, A. Sa´nchez, and M. S. Miguel,
Physical Review E 90, 022810 (2014).
[8] J. Grujic´, C. Gracia-La´zaro, M. Milinski, D. Semmann,
A. Traulsen, J. Cuesta, Y. Moreno, and A. Sa´nchez,
Scientific Reports 4, 4615 EP (2014).
[9] G. Cimini and A. Sa´nchez, Journal of The Royal Society
Interface 11 (2014).
13
[10] C. Gracia-La´zaro, A. Ferrer, G. Ruiz, A. Taranco´n,
J. Cuesta, A. Sa´nchez, and Y. Moreno, Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences 109, 12922 (2012).
[11] G. Cimini and A. Sanchez, Journal of Artificial Societies
and Social Simulation 18, 22 (2015).
[12] M. A. Amaral, L. Wardil, M. Perc, and J. K. L. da Silva,
Physical Review E 94, 032317 (2016).
[13] X. Liu, M. He, Y. Kang, and Q. Pan, Physical Review
E 94, 012124 (2016).
[14] Z.-X. Wu and Z. Rong, Physical Review E 90, 062102
(2014).
[15] T. P latkowski and P. Bujnowski, Physical Review E 79,
036103 (2009).
[16] X. Chen and L. Wang, Physical Review E 77, 017103
(2008).
[17] G. Szabo´ and G. Fa´th, Physics Reports 446, 97 (2007).
[18] C. P. Roca and D. Helbing, Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 108, 11370 (2011).
[19] J. Du, B. Wu, P. M. Altrock, and L. Wang, Journal of
The Royal Society Interface 11 (2014).
[20] J. Du, B. Wu, and L. Wang, Scientific Reports 5, 8014
EP (2015).
[21] M. Posch, A. Pichler, and K. Sigmund, Proceedings of
the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences
266, 1427 (1999).
[22] Y. van Bergen, I. Coolen, and K. N. Laland, Proceed-
ings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological
Sciences 271, 957 (2004).
[23] B. G. Galef and E. E. Whiskin, Animal Behaviour 75,
2035 (2008).
[24] C. Gru¨ter, T. J. Czaczkes, and F. L. W. Ratnieks, Be-
havioral Ecology and Sociobiology 65, 141 (2011).
[25] L. L. Lopes and G. C. Oden, Journal of Mathematical
Psychology 43, 286 (1999).
[26] L. L. Thompson, E. A. Mannix, and M. H. Bazer-
man, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54,
86 (1988).
[27] S. Siegel, Psychological Review 64, 253 (1957).
[28] W. Clay Hamner and D. L. Harnett, Journal of Experi-
mental Social Psychology 11, 329 (1975).
[29] G. Szabo´, A. Szolnoki, and J. Vukov, EPL 87, 18007
(2009).
[30] T. P latkowski, Applied Mathematics and Computation
251, 46 (2015).
[31] C. Hauert and G. Szabo´, American Journal of Physics,
American Journal of Physics 73, 405 (2005).
[32] N. G. van Kampen, Stochastic processes in physics and
chemistry, 3rd ed. (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2007).
[33] C. W. Gardiner, Handbook of Stochastic Methods for
Physics, Chemistry, and the Natural Sciences, 3rd ed.
(Springer, Berlin, 2004).
[34] R. Mahnke, J. Kaupuzs, and I. Lubashevsky, Physics
of Stochastic Processes: How Randomness Acts in Time
(WILEY-VCH, Weinheim, 2009).
[35] A. Traulsen, J. M. Pacheco, and M. A. Nowak, Journal
of theoretical biology 246, 522 (2007).
[36] T. Caraco, S. Martindale, and T. S. Whittam, Animal
Behaviour 28, 820 (1980).
[37] I. S. Lim, P. Wittek, and J. Parkinson, Animal Be-
haviour 110, 69 (2015).
[38] P. M. Rabbitt, Journal of Experimental Psychology 71,
264 (1966).
[39] D. Laming, Acta Psychologica 43, 199 (1979).
[40] G. Gratton, M. G. H. Coles, and E. Donchin, Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General 121, 480 (1992).
[41] C. Hilbe, L. A. Martinez-Vaquero, K. Chatterjee, and
M. A. Nowak, Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 114, 4715 (2017).
[42] H. Ohtsuki, C. Hauert, E. Lieberman, and M. A. Nowak,
Nature 441, 502 (2006).
[43] M. van Baalen and D. A. Rand, Journal of Theoretical
Biology 193, 631 (1998).
[44] A. Szolnoki, A. Antonioni, M. Tomassini, and M. Perc,
EPL (Europhysics Letters) 105, 48001 (2014).
[45] E. S. Colizzi and P. Hogeweg, BMC Evolutionary Biology
16, 31 (2016).
[46] R. M. Paul E. Smaldino, Jeffrey C. Schank, The Ameri-
can Naturalist 181, 451 (2013).
[47] M. L. Boas, Mathematical Methods in the Physical Sci-
ences, 3rd ed. (John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, 2005).
